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MAKING WAR ON JUPITER PLUVIUS
THE CULTURE AND SCIENCE OF RAINMAKING
IN THE SOUTHERN GREAT PLAINS, 1870-1913

MICHAEL R. WHITAKER

funds, while others were equally certain of the
reality of the connection and regarded the potential windfall great enough to justifY any expense.
Scientists in particular were almost unanimously
doubtful (and occasionally hostile), and made
their views clear in the scholarly organs of their
profession. In the end, the experiments failed to
prove a definitive connection; indeed, as many
had predicted all along, sober assessments of the
data yielded litrle to suggest any causal link between explosions and rainfall. Yet, curiously, this
was by no means the end of the theory. Over the
course of two decades, a colorful cast of characters, from an eccentric self-titled "general" to a
millionaire cereal magnate-cum-social engineer,
typified a stubborn core of devoted believers.
Each attempted to prove (or make practical use
of) the theory by discharging various weapons
and explosives at the sky, hoping that raindrops
would come down in exchange.
How is it that in spite of the vehement opposition of scientific experts and the ambiguous results of field tests, the theory maintained such a
durable and loyal following, and even won federal
funding? This essay will attempt to demonstrate
that the appeal and resiliency of the concussive

For two weeks in August 1891, the grounds of
the "C" Ranch in rural West Texas thundered
with the sound of explosions, as a federal government-sponsored expeditionary force hurled hundreds of pounds of heavy ordnance against an
invisible enemy. In command of this unusual operation was "General" Robert Dyrenforth, who
with $9,000 of congressional funding in pocket
was doing his utmost to find out whether, as a bit
of folk wisdom ran, the furious tumult and aerial
concussions of battle could somehow cause rain.
From tiny western hamlets to the metropolises of
the East, Americans were fascinated by the sensational experiments. In magazines, newspapers,
and journals, some scoffed at what they saw as
a fool's errand and an egregious waste of public
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theory of "pluviculture" stems from the fact that
its foundation was cultural-rooted in social-political attitudes about the environment and progress-as much or more than it was scientific. In
other words, within the United States, the theory
established a devoted following and was able to
~thstand unanimous scientific critique and even
practical failures because it originated in powerful and deeply held ideas in the American psyche
of the Progressive era.!
Foremost among these ideas was the notion of
North America as a landscape that ought to be
conquered and tamed by Americans as a kind of
grand national endeavor-a sentiment neatly encapsulated and expressed by the phrase "manifest
destiny." In terms of the environment, this played
out in a large-scale pattern of clearing away the
wilderness and putting plow to earth wherever
settlers wished to grow crops, with little regard
to the local climate and terrain. 2 And where Native groups were seen as an obstacle to progress,
colonists and soldiers often waged war against
them. The concussion theory, then, offered the
psychologically satisfying thought that the struggle
to tame the environment and the struggle against
the Native peoples were in fact one in the same,
and accordingly might be "won" with literally the
very same "weapons" and strategies-the detonation of high explosives. For this reason, as we shall
see, the language and aesthetics of militarism and
conquest permeated the discourse and conduct of
concussionist experiments. Furthermore, inflexible determination was elevated as the attribute
both necessary and sufficient for success.
The lived experience of the Civil War was another factor that contributed to the resiliency of
the concussionist position. The Civil War was a
conflict of unprecedented carnage and destruction, of countrymen taking up arms against one
another and national unity shattered, and of
profound moral questions over the institution
of slavery and the status of African Americans
in American society. Alongside these weighty issues, however, veterans reflecting on their war
experience also very often remembered the precipitation. A rifleman who fought at Antietam,
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Shiloh, Chickamauga, or Gettysburg, to name only a few cases,

would have experienced a drenching rain at some
point after the battle's conclusion. So strong was
the apparent connection that it became a matter
of general understanding that the concussion of
battle would reliably bring precipitation. 3 Hence,
when Edward Powers published a chronicle of
Civil War battles followed by rain in his 1871 War
and the Weather, he was not advancing a novel
theory but rather putting into print a conclusion
that thousands of Union and Confederate soldiers from private to general had already formed
in their own minds. In this way, the concussionist
theory appealed to a shared experience lodged in
the minds of an enormous cohort of former fighting men. 4 This strong reliance on experience also
served to immunize the theory against criticisms
based on theories of meteorology and physics.
Even before independence, many Americans
had regarded westward expansion as an expression of national progress and personal liberation,
a sentiment that grew stronger with the advent
of the industrial revolution and its concomitant
urbanization in the early nineteenth century.
The Great Plains had beckoned would-be settlers
from the east to escape the ceaseless toil of the big
city and come west to try their hand at agriculture, filling their lungs with the refreshing air of
the independent life and revitalizing the national
spirit. But where railroads and land barons had
promised endless tracts of fecund soil and effortless harvests, geography often failed to match expectations, and in few places was this truer than
the Llano Estacado, or Staked Plains, a sprawling,
bone-dry expanse of beige that could go months
or even years at a time with little to no precipitation. It was in this desperate situation that Americans began dreaming up other ways to bring precious moisture to the land. Some posited that
the farmer who took a leap of faith in cultivating
marginal land would be rewarded with increased
rainfall. As early as 1867, University of Pennsylvania geologist Ferdinand Hayden was suggesting
that the mere act of settlement was improving
the climate of the West, a sentiment that C. D.
Wilbur later summed up in the famous mantra
"rain follows the plow."5 A similar idea, that the
electrical current carried in railroad tracks or telegraph wires had increased precipitation in the
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West, was sufficiently believed that John Wesley
Powell felt it necessary to include a disproof in
his 1878 Report on the Lands of the Arid Region.6 In
view of these facts, the concussion theory emerges as a natural next step in a progression of ideas
in which tokens of civilization and progress were
imagined to have some power to affect the environment. Concussionism, however, reduced the
tokenism in favor of heavy firepower, preferring
realist to symbolic thinking.
SETTING THE STAGE

The single most influential text in the story of the
concussionism was Edward Powers's War and the
Weather. The book compiled a list of hundreds of
battles that had been followed by rain, and the
aforementioned wetness of the Civil War provided plenty of grist for Powers's mill. War and
the Weather first appeared in print in 1871, with a
second edition appearing in 1890. In the interim
between the publications, Powers and others of a
similar mentality had persistently memorialized
Congress, the army, the navy, and several other
governmental offices to contribute funding and
weaponry to test the idea, and scored a crucial
convert in the person of Illinois senator Charles
B. Farwell. Farwell made the cause a pet project,
introducing several requests for funding in the
Senate, and finally gained traction with his colleagues in 1890, the same year War and the Weather reappeared for a new generation of readers. By
that time, the rainy battles of the Civil War would
not have been so fresh in the public memory as
they had been in 1871, but another factor had by
then emerged to renew the relevance and popularity of the theory: accelerating settlement of the
Great Plains coupled with severe and recurring
droughts in the late 1880s. At Farwell's behest,
Congress authorized $9,000 to be set aside for
testing the strange hypothesis. As nothing of this
sort had ever been attempted before, there was
some uncertainty as to which branch of the government ought to handle it, but it was eventually
decided that the most appropriate agency was the
Division of Forestry, then within Jeremiah Rusk's
Department of Agriculture. 7 This decision would
put something of a wrinkle in the proceedings;
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Bernhard Fernow, chief of the Forestry Division,
was adamant that his division lacked the apparatus and authority to carry out such an undertaking, and moreover, was embarrassed to be connected to what he considered rank foolishness. In
his annual report to Rusk, for example, Fernow
declared that any experiments "would hardly fail
to be barren of results."8
Having made his objections clear, Fernow was
relieved of his responsibilities, and the operation
was redelegated to assistant secretary of agriculture Edwin Willits. Though more sympathetic to
the possibility of rainmaking by concussion, Willits was in agreement with Fernow that neither
the Forestry Division nor its parent department
were equipped to perform the experiments. For
this reason, Willits in February 1891 appointed
an ad hoc special agent in the person of "General" Robert G. Dyrenforth-a Washington, DC,
patent lawyer with an amateur interest in meteorology and explosives, and not incidentally, a
convinced concussionist-to execute the experiments. 9 Dyrenforth spent the next five months
assembling a team of assistants, acquiring materials, and selecting a test site, eventually accepting
the offer of Chicago meat packer Nelson Morris,
who promised to extend the party complimentary room and board at his "c" Ranch outside
Midland, Texas, while underwriting labor costs
and other miscellaneous expenses. Local business
concerns were similarly generous, donating gunpowder, dynamos, chemicals, and other useful
goods to the effort, while the Texas and Pacific
Railroad extended further assistance in the form
of free transportation of personnel and material
to Midland. lO
In August 1891, the arrangements now sorted
out, Dyrenforth and his entourage made their
way by rail to the test site. Dyrenforth had decided that oversize kites carrying "rackarock" charges
and hydrogen-oxygen balloons would offer a superior concussion and be easier to elevate to the
desired altitude. Therefore he brought with him
a balloonist and two chemists who would oversee
the field production of the hydrogen and oxygen
gas that would provide both the balloons' buoyant
force and explosive matter. Also in the party were
two guests of honor: ex-Confederate general Dan-
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FIo. 1. Dyrenforth and party at the
thighs).

"c" Ranch, Texas,

1891. Dyrenforth is fifth from the left (seated in chair, hands resting on

iel Ruggles, who in 1880 had patented a method
of artificial rainmaking involving balloons with
attached dynamite charges, and Edward Powers,
whose book had been so instrumental in transforming a folk theory into an object of serious
scientific inquiry. Rounding out the investigative
team was George E. Curtis of the Smithsonian
Institution, a meteorologist who, like division
chief Fernow, was sharply skeptical of the principle at the foundation of the endeavor.1I
EXPERIMENTING BEGINS

Beginning on August 9, Dyrenforth and his party
began unleashing their fearsome barrages against
the atmosphere (initially at the "C" Ranch and
subsequently at El Paso and San Diego, Texas, at
the invitation of local businesses and municipal
leaders), inflating and exploding several dozen
oxyhydrogen balloons and detonating thousands
of pounds of explosives over the course of several
weeks. Dyrenforth took pains to ensure that the
desert trial simulated a battle in both appearance
and spirit. In terms of arrangement, the "general"
arranged three parallel two-mile-long firing lines in

a formation that must have resembled a battery of
artillery pieces. On the front line was a row of juryrigged mortars that were set up as to hurl dynamite and rackarock charges skyward. Supporting
the front line was a line of custom-built kites with
dynamite charges attached, tethered to the earth
by electrical cable that also served to transmit the
detonation signal. Finally, in the rearguard of the
battalion was the "main line" at which twelvefoot balloons filled with oxygen and hydrogen gas
would ascend hundreds of feet in the air to be
exploded, like the kites, by electrical signals from
the groundY But even in the superficial and the
intangible details, Dyrenforth adopted a military
model, sporting a pith helmet and cavalry boots
throughout the investigation. The official party
portrait shows the men relaxing on a porch, eight
of them topped with helmets to match Dyrenforth's, and three visibly gripping shotgunsY
PUBLIC RESPONSE

The enormous public appetite for news on the
pluviculture experiments is attested by the enthusiasm with which hopeful Americans from the re-
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motest corners of the nation cried out for haste.
Henry Holdes, a self-described "poor farmer"
from the remote frontier hamlet of Yuma, Colorado, wrote to Secretary Rusk, earnestly offering
use of his land for any experiments at no charge,
and thoughtfully including a hand-drawn map
of his community and a table of meteorological
observations. 14 In Wichita, where the droughts of
the late 1880s had taken a heavy toll, the Daily
Eagle pleaded with the secretary of agriculture:
"There could hardly be a more opportune occasion for making the experiment.... Try it, Uncle
Jerry; try it now."15
The speed with which news from Midland
appeared in newspapers nationwide further illustrates the level of national interest. On August
10, a Monday, some twelve hours after the experiment's opening salvo, rain began to fall and an
enthusiastic party member wired Senator Farwell
to share the good news; by Thursday, papers
from coast to coast were ready to anoint the experimenters as the saviors of national agriculture.
The Rocky Mountain News of Denver declared
"They Made Rain," while the Chicago Times proclaimed that the visionary Farwell had "outdone
Moses."16 As the experiments continued, the
flood of positive press continued. The front page
of the Washington Post announced "Bombs Cause
Rain to FaIL"17 "Rain Made to Order" one New
York Times front-page headline declared, informing readers that "it began to rain immediately" after Dyrenforth exploded a balloon and a healthy
dose of dynamite. Two days later, readers learned
that Van Horn, Texas, had experienced its heaviest rain in years, the cloudburst attributed to the
party's weather meddling. 1s Not mentioned was
the fact that Van Horn is some 180 miles from
Midland. Such was typical of the Dyrenforthfriendly press: determined to report successful
results, and not about to let facts stand in the way
of a good story. Readers scarcely heard that August generally signaled the beginning of the rainy
season in the Texas plains, or that fewer than half
the barrages had resulted in rain of any appreciable volume {and in at least one of those cases,
the Weather Bureau had already predicted rain
anyway).19

21l

CONCUSSIONISM AS MILITARY PROXY

Clearly, Dyrenforth's desert venture was more
than some parochial sideshow. On the contrary,
it resonated with cultural attitudes about the
environment, and gives us a window on some
prominent modes of thinking about nature and
settlement. In more ways than one, the din of the
battlefield was very much in the minds of those
who undertook, reported on, and thought about
the experiments. Dyrenforth himself was clear
that his driving methodology in the desert had
always been "to imitate the effects of a great battle
as nearly as possible."20 In describing the proceedings, writers made frequent use of military imagery and terminology in their descriptions of elements of the experiment as well as of the entire
enterprise, even when the connection was not
necessarily an obvious one. "Sounding like the
report of a six-inch rifle on shipboard" was the
simile offered by a New York Times reporter, describing a trial explosion of one of Dyrenforth's
balloons in Washington, DC. 21 A concerned citizen wrote the editor of the Times proposing that
something similar to the undertaking in Texas be
essayed in the East to relieve the ongoing drought
there. "Let the forts on Governors Island, Fort
Hamilton, and Staten Island, and the war vessels
stationed at the navy yard commence a bombardment, and shake the heavens until the clouds
yield rain.... Let the Department of War issue
an order for a general bombardment," he wrote,
making abundantly clear his preference for heavy
ordnance to less bellicose methods such as explosive hydrogen balloons or rackarock-Iaden kites. 22
In yet another article, the writer noted that "the
experimenters have maintained a continuous
'skirmish' at the field of operation, while the bigger 'guns' in the shape of oxygen apparatus and
hydrogen generators were being set Up."23 Even in
the context of the experiment, the gas generators,
which merely supplied the hydrogen and oxygen
for the balloons, had little in common with artillery pieces in either purpose or appearance. That
the writer at any rate thought of them as guns
illustrates the extent to which a strong undercurrent of military power informed understandings
of what was taking place on the plains of Texas.
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In addition, besides the literary allusions, there
were more literal factors that contributed to the
view of the experiments as a military operation.
The U.S. Navy supplied the party with iron turnings. Although the turnings were simply scrap
metal to be used in the chemical production of
hydrogen and oxygen, it is easy to imagine that
someone not familiar with the term might have
assumed that the navy was supplying Dyrenforth
and his party with munitions. When the investigators relocated from Midland to EI Paso, they
met with the Major James Henton and Lieutenant S. Allen Dyer of nearby Fort Bliss, who put
twenty privates from the Twenty-third Infantry
at the disposal of the experimenters, which can
only have reinforced the public image of the enterprise as a military undertaking.
If the experiments were indeed symbolic proxies for real battle, who was the enemy? The Washington Post typified the answer to this question,
characterizing the high winds that were playing
havoc with the balloon and kite operations as
a "powerful and relentless enemy," adding that
Dyrenforth and company had nevertheless scored
"a fitting victory ... in their efforts to shake water from the burning winds."24 Other newspapers
identified the adversary as the clouds, the sky,
or the atmosphere, but the underlying idea was
usually the same: that the environment, unwilling to cooperate with the settlers' designs upon
it by selfishly withholding its vital moisture, was
the enemy.25
"CAN WE MAKE IT RAIN!"

Another important element that emerges in literature sympathetic to Dyrenforth's experiments
is a characteristic prioritizing of experience over
meteorological theory and, furthermore, a feeling
that inflexible willpower, rather than scientific
method, was the key to success. After all, War and
the Weather was not much more than a compendium of battle narratives appended with a dash of
tentative meteorological theory.26 A letter to the
New York Times considered the concussive theory
"proven" based solely on "the testimony of many
general officers engaged in the Mexican war and
in the late civil war," while another concerned

citizen opined that the results, not the mechanism, should be the main object of interest, declaring "after the thing is done we shall all be in
a receptive mood for the explanation of how it
is done."27 In a letter quoted in Scientific American, Senator Farwell explained that his belief in
the rainmaking power of concussion came not
in connection with any understanding of atmospheric moisture but rather from the "historical
and undisputed" understanding that "that after
all the great battles fought during the century,
heavy rainfalls have occurred. "28 The New York
Times, in explaining the influx of rain that had
accompanied the desert trials, observed that "[tl
he Scientific Person has not been heard from,"
but that "Gen. Dyrenforth is not a man with a
[proof], but a man of ideas."29
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the "general" in command of the experiments was of a similar mentality. In October 1891, after the investigators'
explosives had fallen silent, Dyrenforth took up
the affirmative position in a marquee column
for the North American Review entitled "Can We
Make It Rain?"30 Besides the customary chronicle
of rain-soaked battles from recent history, Dyrenforth included a battery of testimonial letters
from particularly esteemed Civil War veterans
to buttress his position. Among these luminaries were Joshua Chamberlain, then-governor of
Maine who had been decorated with the Medal
of Honor as a brevet major general in the Civil
War; John McNulta, Illinois representative and
Civil War general; and no less than James A.
Garfield, former president and major general
in the Union Army.3! And in his report to Congress, Dyrenforth appended his write-up with six
full pages of testimonials from local eyewitnesses
who had wandered by to observe the proceedings. When it came to meteorological theory,
however, Dyrenforth had not much to say: in that
same document, he admitted that although he
had received a number of suggested theories as
to the mechanism of concussive pluviculture, he
was unable to understand many of themY But
this was a small matter; crafting a rigorous theoretical basis for concussionism had always been of
secondary importance. Rather, a social logic that
prioritized empirical observation and bare-bones
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pragmatism informed and supported the reasoning of the concussionists.
In fact, Dyrenforth-friendly literature seems to
have been aware of the incompatibility of their
criteria of proof-based on experience, common
sense, and intuition-with those of the scientific establishment and its functionaries, as the
clashing paradigms engendered a simmering but
perceptible mutual enmity. When peering across
this gulf, pluviculture boosters painted their opponents as elitist snobs and bureaucratic jobsworths, and took a particular relish in narrating
their failures. 33 One writer, praising Dyrenforth's
proactive use of the congressional appropriation
mused that the $9,000 might otherwise have
been "squandered" had it instead been invested
in the Weather Bureau "which, as everybody
knows, is supplied ad nauseum with every sort
of weather except the desired or expected sort."
Referencing the forestry chiefs antipathy for the
Dyrenforth expedition, the same author scoffed,
"Mr. Fernow, we regret to say, thought that Gen.
Dyrenforth could not make it rain, and proved
that he could not by illustrious names which we
will not mortify by citing here any further than
may be necessary."H A New York Times columnist
looked forward to the inevitable "mystification
of the nearest local weather sharp . . . and the
forcible overthrow of all the accumulated lore
and stock signs of the Signal Bureau and its observers."35 The "general" himself apparently felt
a similar disdain for bureaucratic naysayers. The
ranch-hand cowboys, he claimed in an interview,
were far more knowledgeable in weather matters
than office-bound meteorologistS, whom he derisively called "those special advisory agents of
Providence on weather matters. "36
As tantalizing as the prospect of rain on demand may have been (or perhaps because it
seemed too good to be true), the concussionists' doubters were many, and made their views
known as loudly as the supporters. Forestry Division chief Fernow, thankful to have had the experiment taken off his hands, was nevertheless
aghast at the choice of Dyrenforth as the principal
investigator. "I strongly advise everybody to have
his ark ready for the deluge," he quipped. 37 The
volume of reliable information trickling out of
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Texas increased, and the mediocrity of the results
became more apparent. Skeptical newspapers,
which probably outnumbered the faithful from
the end of August onward as the smoke cleared,
characterized the experiments as "absurd, not
to say shameless, misrepresentation," "an utter
and ridiculous failure," and other choice phrases. 38 The New York Times-which in August had
published its fair share of booster columns for
Dyrenforth and company-by November was now
playing the experiments for laughs. As the city
water reservoirs ran dangerously low, it mused
that the National Guard might lend a hand by
engaging in some artillery practice-but only as
a "jocular suggestion."39 George Curtis, the meteorologist assigned to the expedition, penned a
blistering tirade for the St. Louis Republic, calling
the experiment a "miserable farce" and its commanding general "an inexcusable bungler ... his
botchwork a burlesque on science and common
sense."40 Not fully drained of his frustration,
Curtis went on the attack again in the following
year, writing that to promulgate the concussionist
hypothesis was "to reject the light of civilization
and to retrograde to a cruder and less rational apprehension of natural phenomena."41
Though Curtis's critiques may have been particularly searing, his sentiment was not atypical
of his profession. Publications associated with
related sciences such as Nature, Science, American
Meteorological Journal, and Engineering Magazine,
to name a few, printed essays often laced with
scornful undertones of varying degrees of subtlety, confidently asserting the impossibility of
concussive pluviculture and tearing apart Dyrenforth's methodology.42 The Meteorologist declared
the theory "low and degrading. "43 Physics professor Alexander Macfarlane, who like Curtis was
an eyewitness to the goings-on, hammered out
a fulminating critique for the inaugural issue of
the Transactions of the Texas Academy of Science,
peppered with phrases and terms such as "no
better than the medicine man of the Indians,"
"useless," "impostor," "ignorance," and "so-called
facts and cranky arguments. "44 The acidity of the
scientists' counterattack against the concussionists underscores the epistemological and methodological differences between the two groups.
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When Curtis, Macfarlane, and others like them
wished to rebut the concussionists, there was no
shared foundation of knowledge on which they
could construct the kinds of collegial arguments
they would have made against a fellow scientist in
the pages of Scientific American.
DYRENFORTH'S SUCCESSORS

Public esteem for Dyrenforth reached its zenith
in the Texas plains in August 1891 but did not
maintain its lofty position for long. The Department of Agriculture declined to renew his appointment as special agent after his term expired
the following summer. As concussionism's critics grew more numerous and vocal, the diehard
believers, including Edward Powers, the father
of the theory, wasted no time in making a scapegoat of the "general," blaming the failure of the
experiments on Dyrenforth's shoddy execution.
The man once dubbed "General Jupiter Pluvius"
now had a new nickname: "Dry-henceforth."45
Yet even as the champion sank into disrepute and
obscurity, the cause persisted, with the hallmarks
of incorporated militarism and social logic. As
the government tests came to an end in Texas, a
coalition of local politicians and business leaders
came together to pledge to carry on the experi- '
ments on their own funding. 46 In 1894, during an
especially dry summer, a group of Nebraska citizens formed the "Rain God Association," a kind
of rainmaking militia that raised $1,000 to give
the concussion theory a trial of their own. The
"Rain Gods" built a ZOO-mile line of gunpowder
firing stations on hilltops along the forty-second
parallel, and detonated them simultaneously, to
no appreciable effectY In the first decade of the
twentieth century, it was not uncommon in times
of forest fire for locals to petition their local army
or naval base for a barrage to try to bring some
rain clouds. 48 The most serious post-Dyrenforth
inquiry into concussive pluviculture, however,
came about twenty years after the "general" and
his party had finally decamped from Texas, but it
unfolded in the very same locale as the 1891 trials.
In 1910, breakfast cereal king Charles w. Post's
experimental colony at Post City, Texas, had been
up and running for about four years.49 Located

FIG.

2. Charles William Post.

about one hundred miles northeast of Midland,
Post and his colonists had thus far eked out meager harvests by experimenting with expensive
irrigation systems, cultivating unconventional,
drought-resistant crops, and employing dryland
farming techniques. Post, however, saw the potential for much more in the land, and after "an
exhaustive study" of rainmaking was convinced
that Dyrenforth had been on the right track
all along and the concussion theory had merit.
"General J.G. [sic) Dyrenforth, a well-knowil scientist and meteorologist . .. left no doubt . . . that
the rains were caused by the explosions," Post
proclaimed in a special piece for Harper's Weekly.
"[Tlhe world, generally, seems to have forgotten
that rain could be produced artificially."50
Between 1910 and 1912, Post conducted dozens of experiments, or "battles" as he preferred
to call them, at times also employing the terms
"attack upon the elements" and "fight with Jupiter"-and in so doing repeated all the characteristic elements of the previous generation's concussionists. 5l For example, in conducting his trials,
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Post directed his managers to try to emulate a
battle, and by one account succeeded spectacularly. In 1911 a reporter for the Beckham County
Democrat happened to pass by Post City during a
"battle" and recorded his impressions:
[A]long the verge of cliffs we could see the
flash, the clouds of smoke rising and with
our ears pierced by the deafening reports we
were with Roosevelt at San Juan Hill and
were storming the block house .... [Als the
increased thundering of the guns seemed
to rend the very air over and around us, we
thought we were with General Hooker at the
Battle Above the Clouds.sz
Like his pluvicultural predecessors, Post's results were at best inconsistent. From the spring
of 1911 to the summer of 1913, he waged about
twenty-one "battles," but only half the time did
rain follow. Yet his patience for failure was virtually unlimited: after each unsuccessful effort, he
would simply fine tune some variable or other
and perhaps increase the tonnage of explosives
(and on one occasion blame his supplier for
faulty dynamite), as if the outcome of the experiment had been a tantalizing near miss. The key to
this conviction can be found in a letter he wrote
to his managers, castigating them for a perceived
lack of interest in the project: "I want extraordinary attention given to this subject," he insisted,
"for it means a very great deal to the country at
large, and all of us are included."53 For Post, then,
the "battles" for rain were no less than battles for
the fate of the nation, the outcomes of which
depended upon man's ability to master the environment. Though he was far too young to have
fought in the Civil War, he made frequent reference to downpours that had supposedly followed
the momentous clashes from that conflict, and
probably imagined that just as in those battles,
unwavering determination would be necessary
for victory. "In these experiments we are following a practice that absolutely and unfailingly did
produce rain during the Civil War," he wrote, invoking the socially persuasive power of memory
and experience. "Every man who was in battle
knows that rain invariably followed the heavy
concussions."54 Nonexperiential knowledge, by
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contrast, was of less consequence: "I am not so
much interested in the scientific as the practical
side," Post wrote. "I am more engrossed in the
results than the method."55 Indeed, Post made
clear his distrust of certain naysaying scientists,
declaring with certainty (as many optimistic concussionists had done before him) that "the theory
of artificial rain making is not the mere chimera
that some scientifically inclined men would have
us believe."56

THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN RAINMAKING

In 1894, Mark W. Harrington, chief of the
Weather Bureau, completed an essay for the
Smithsonian Institution's annual report. Titled
"Weather Making, Ancient and Modern," he
identified three classes of weather-making efforts from human history, which corresponded
to a civilization's stage of advancement. The first
and most primitive of these was the class of superstitious efforts, which originated in formal
or organized religious belief. Following this was
the class of folklore remnants, which were said
to be fragments and vestiges of the first type, yet
maintained "a curious persistency in civilized
countries." Finally, the class of physical methods, which Harrington proclaimed was "mainly
American and intensely practical," appealed to
objective physical laws rather than psychic impulses as the first two did. 57 Harrington sorted
Dyrenforth's escapade into the third category,
but as we have seen, a great deal if not most of
the logic behind it spawned from social expectations and beliefs. Although its adherents claimed
scientific legitimacy, this was more a vulnerability than a strength, as it demanded testable and
falsifiable grounds for inquiry. Its great resiliency
and durability-its "curious persistency," to borrow Harrington's term-came from the fact that
it appealed to intuitive and obvious ideas that
were firmly anchored in contemporary notions
of nature and the "rightness" of the American
conquest of North America.
In his Harper's Weekly essay, Post perfectly
encapsulated the spirit that had motivated both
him and concussionists past:
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In the spring of 1911 crops on the ranch began
to need rain. There were no signs of nature
that pointed to any immediate conclusion of
the drought. There was no method by which
I could run irrigation ditches in time to alleviate conditions. It was under the stress of these
conditions that I resolved to carry the war into
the country of Jupiter Pluvius and bombard
him until he surrendered enough rain to save
the crops. 58
CONCLUSION

Post and the settlers had come to the West with
the intention of conquering and reshaping what
they found there to suit their needs. When something stood in the way of that vision, whatever it
was, Americans relied on their will and strength
to smash through the obstacle.
In Post's experiments, we can discern distinct echoes of the very same driving forces that
informed the mentality of the previous generations of concussionists. Where Dyrenforth
sported cavalry boots and bestowed upon himself
a lofty military rank, Post conducted "battles"
and made sure that the Civil War was never far
from anyone's mind in the process. Like-minded
Americans picked up on these threads, which
we see played out in the frequent and occasionally strained allusions to weapons and battles in
contemporary literature. From this we can understand that the prevailing mentality of dominating the continent from the 1890s to the 1910s
tended to conflate conquest of the natural world
with military conquest. 59 As well, from the publication of War and the Weather in 1870 onward, a
powerful social logic worked behind the scenes to
provide a convincing and durable foundation for
the belief-a logic that drew on intuitive and experiential knowledge while downplaying abstract
and objective scientific principles.
The persistence of concussionism in the national consciousness illuminates a mechanism
by which nonexpert theories about the environment can ostensibly root themselves in "science"
yet can withstand both material counterevidence
and adamant opposition from the scientific establishment-a phenomenon with clear contem-

porary relevance. Concussionists from Powers to
Post made gestures toward the laws of meteorology and physics but in the main traded in social
logic, grounding their arguments in appeals to
subjective experience, common sense, folk knowledge, intuition, and the like.
The concussionism craze also illustrates the
fundamental contingency of the climate change
denial movement. About a century ago, when the
socioeconomically Progressive ethos of continual
growth and improvement demanded that rain
come to arid regions of the country, settlement
boosters assembled a quasi-scientific narrative to
support the belief that weather was something
that could be easily controlled and manipulated
through artificial means. However, when the
prospect of climate change has shifted from advantageous to potentially catastrophic, followers
of a similar conservative doctrine now find it prudent to deny the possibility that human activity
could be the cause of climate change, or that such
a phenomenon could even exist. The idea common to both cases is that the invisible hand of
economic progress will reshape the environment
for the benefit of producer and consumer. In this
way we see that the latter-day aversion to the possibility of climate change is in no wayan essential
facet of the American conservatism, but rather
is contingent upon the perceived consequences
that climate change itself is seen to engender.
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